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Abstract
We live in a society in which knowledge is power. For the companies, knowing
their users, how they behave, and what they like can help them to improve their
products, show personalized ads, or, in the worst case, sell this data to third
parties.
As a user, most of the time we are not aware of how much personal data we share
and we do not know who can be collecting this data and how it is being used.
For this reason, it is necessary that the user data collected is anonymized. In this
way, companies can continue obtaining information but users are not harmed. Here
is where Differential Privacy appears. As we will see, this technique allows data
collection and anonymization without compromising user’s privacy. If an attacker
intercepts the data, identifying a single user will not be possible regardless of the
knowledge of the attacker.
This technique is very powerful, but the applications outside of the academic world
are limited.
RAPPOR is an example of a real world application. It is an algorithm developed
by Google to collect data applying local Differential Privacy, this is, anonymizing
the data before sending it for analysis.
In this work it is explained the transition from the academic explanation of
RAPPOR, performing experiments following the scientific method to validate
its functioning, to an implementation in one of the most used web browsers in
the world, Firefox, using software engineering techniques to plan, design and
implement the project securing a correct design of the involved components.
Moreover, a research on the legal and socioeconomic implications of this project
is included.
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Resumen
Vivimos en un mundo en el que el conocimiento es poder. Y para las empresas,
conocer a sus usuarios, saber sus gustos y sus comportamientos, puede ayudarles
a mejorar sus productos, mostrar publicidad ma´s personalizada, o en el peor de
los casos, vender dichos datos a terceros.
Como usuarios, muchas veces no somos conscientes de la cantidad de datos que
generamos, y no sabemos quie´n puede estar recogiendo esos datos ni co´mo los
puede usar.
Por esto, es necesario que los datos que se recogen acerca de los usuarios este´n
anonimizados. De esta forma, las empresas pueden seguir obteniendo informacio´n,
pero los usuarios no se ven perjudicados. Aqu´ı es donde entra la privacidad
diferencial. Como veremos, esta te´cnica permite recoger datos y anonimizarlos
de tal forma que si un atacante los intercepta, nunca podra´ identificar si los datos
de cierto usuario esta´n presentes, independientemente de la informacio´n que se
posea de e´ste en el conjunto de datos.
Esta te´cnica es muy potente, pero no es posible encontrar muchas aplicaciones que
se hayan puesto en pra´ctica ma´s alla´ del mundo acade´mico.
Una de estas implementaciones es RAPPOR, un algoritmo desarrollado por Google
para recoger datos aplicando privacidad diferencial local, esto es, anonimizando los
datos antes de ser enviados para su ana´lisis.
En este trabajo se recoge co´mo se ha pasado de la explicacio´n acade´mica de
RAPPOR, realizando experimentos siguiendo el me´todo cient´ıfico para validar
su funcionamiento, a la implementacio´n en uno de los navegadores ma´s usados del
mundo, Firefox, usando te´cnicas de ingenier´ıa de software para planificar, disen˜ar
y llevar a cabo el proyecto, asegurando un correcto disen˜o de los componentes
involucrados. Adema´s, se incluye un estudio de las posibles implicaciones legales
y socioecono´micas que tiene este proyecto.
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1 Introduction
Every year, computers have faster and cheaper memory and its performance
increases (Moore’s Law [1]). Moreover, Cloud Computing, which allows us to
use computing services over the internet, is a reality and it offers the possibility of
scaling our systems adding more machines easily. With all this capacity, companies
have started to collect more data from their users to understand how they behave
and improve their products, or to sell them to third parties.
Users have now to trust in third parties to store their data and as a consequence
they are exposed to data breaches [2][3] that compromise its security and
privacy.
In the mid 90s, The Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC) released
anonymized data on state employees that showed every hospital visit. The goal
was to provide data to researchers, and the state spent time removing all obvious
identifiers such as name, address and Social Security number. A graduate student
started hunting for the Governor’s hospital records in the GIC data. She knew that
Governor Weld resided in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a city of 54,000 residents and
seven ZIP codes. For twenty dollars, she purchased the complete voter rolls from
the city of Cambridge. This is a database containing, among other things, the
name, address, ZIP code, birth date, and sex of every voter. By combining this
data with the GIC records, she found Governor Weld with ease. Only six people
in Cambridge shared his birth date, only three of them were men, and of them,
only he lived in his ZIP code. The Governor’s health records were de-anonymized.
[4]
In 2007 Netflix offered a $1 million prize for a 10% improvement in its
recommendation system. They also released a training data set for the competing
developers to train their systems. In order to protect their customer’s privacy,
they removed personal information and replaced IDs with random IDs. However,
Netflix is not the only movie-rating portal out there, there are many others such
as IMDb. Researchers linked the Netflix data set with IMDb to de-anonymize the
Netflix data set using the dates on which an user rated certain movies. [5]
Several techniques to anonimyze data keeping it useful for analysis have been
proposed, such as k-anonymity [4], t-closeness [6] and l-diversity [7] but all of
them are prone to attacks. Due to this, attackers can still make inferences about
data sets that may harm individuals.
Differential Privacy [8] [9] is a promising technique that claims to preserve users
privacy while remaining data useful. It is based on the idea of randomized response.
Based on this, Google developed RAPPOR [10], an algorithm to collect anonymous
data.
RAPPOR can be used to collect browsing data. This is an interesting application
which can offer browser companies important data to optimize for certain websites
and also identifying potential malware if the user’s homepage is changed to a non-
trusted source.
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This approach is also useful for an organization like Mozilla, as it tries to balance
the necessity of collecting data to improve Firefox and protect their users, while
preserving the anonymity and privacy of those who use Firefox.
With this idea in mind, the efficacy of the algorithm is evaluated performing
simulations, and a Firefox extension is developed to collect the user’s homepage
in a differential private manner.
This document is divided in different sections. First, we explain the current State
of the Art in privacy preserving techniques. Next, we explain how RAPPOR works.
Later, we show the results of the performed simulations and its conclusions. After
this, we explain how the Firefox extension to collect the user’s homepage has been
developed. Finally, we discuss the software engineering principles applied to this
project, the socioeconomic and legal implications, and the future work on this
field.
The motivation of this work is to demonstrate that privacy preserving techniques
such as differential privacy can be applied in a product used by millions of
people.
The main objectives of this thesis are to show that differential privacy is a step
forward in privacy preserving techniques, and to build a solution that can be used
to collect data using this approach in Firefox.
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2 State of the Art
Before explaining the core of this thesis, the current state of the art should be
exposed to understand the previous and current techniques used to anonymize
data.
First, an overview of anonymizing techniques is summed up to understand the
problem and the solutions that have been proposed over time, its advantages and
drawbacks. Then, the concept of differential privacy is introduced. Finally, we
discuss different implementations for differential privacy.
2.1 Anonymizing data
The problem of anonymizing data while trying to keep it useful has been present
even before the popularization of personal computers. Different techniques have
been introduced to tackle this problem with the purpose of ensuring privacy for
the users.
2.1.1 k-anonymity
k-anonymity [4] was introduced as an attempt to solve the following problem:
“Given person-specific field-structured data, produce a release of a data with
scientific guarantees that the individuals who are the subjects of the data cannot
be re-identified while the data remain practically useful.”
Sweeney showed that the triple (date of birth, gender, zip code) is sufficient to
uniquely identify at least 87% of US citizens in publicly available databases [11].
Then leaving out any unique identifiers like name and Social Security Number
is not enough, which would mean that this approach will never work regarding
anonymity and privacy.
When applying k-anonymity, attributes are suppressed or generalized until the
information for each person contained in the release cannot be distinguished from
at least k − 1 individuals whose information also appear in the release. Thus
prevents definite database linkages. At worst, the data released narrows down an
individual entry to a group of k individuals.
For example, if you want to identify a person and the only information you have
is gender and zip code there should be at least k number of people meeting the
requirement.
A way of k-anonymize data is using the suppression technique.
Suppression
This technique can replace individual attributes with an asterisk (*).
Table 1 be 2-anonymize as follows:
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Name Surname Age Race
Harry Stone 34 African
Carlos Simons 36 Caucasian
Linda Stone 34 African
Carlos Sanchez 22 Hispanic
Table 1: Data before using k-anonymity
Name Surname Age Race
* Stone 34 African
Carlos * * *
* Stone 34 African
Carlos * * *
Table 2: Data after using k-anonymity
In such a way that rows 1 and 3 are identical and Rows 2 and 4 are identical.
The cost of k-anonymous solution to a database is the number of *’s introduced.
The problem here is that it is possible to guarantee k-anonymity substituting every
cell by *, but this renders the database useless. On the other hand, not enough
cells removed would result in a weak database.
The suppression technique can be combined with generalization, replacing
individual attributes with a broader set of categories, to increase the anonymity
of the database.
Name Age Gender State of domicile Religion Disease
Ramsha 29 Female Tamil Nadu Hindu Cancer
Yadu 24 Female Kerala Hindu Viral infection
Salima 28 Female Tamil Nadu Muslim TB
Sunny 27 Male Karnataka Parsi No illness
Joan 24 Female Kerala Christian Heart-related
Bahuksana 23 Male Karnataka Buddhist TB
Rambha 19 Male Kerala Hindu Cancer
Kishor 29 Male Karnataka Hindu Heart-related
Johnson 17 Male Kerala Christian Heart-related
John 19 Male Kerala Christian Viral infection
Table 3: Data before using k-anonymity
Because k-anonymization does not include any randomization, it is still possible
to infer data from individuals given some knowledge about the database. For
example, if the 19-year-old John from Kerala is known to be in the database above,
then it can be reliably said that he has either cancer, a heart-related disease, or a
viral infection. These attacks are even more powerful when several data sets can
be correlated. Moreover, adding, changing or removing tuples may compromise
k-anonymity if the database is not k-anonymize again.
12
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Name Age Gender State of domicile Religion Disease
* 20 < Age ≤ 30 Female Tamil Nadu * Cancer
* 20 < Age ≤ 30 Female Kerala * Viral infection
* 20 < Age ≤ 30 Female Tamil Nadu * TB
* 20 < Age ≤ 30 Male Karnataka * No illness
* 20 < Age ≤ 30 Female Kerala * Heart-related
* 20 < Age ≤ 30 Male Karnataka * TB
* Age ≤ 20 Male Kerala * Cancer
* 20 < Age ≤ 30 Male Karnataka * Heart-related
* Age ≤ 20 Male Kerala * Heart-related
* Age ≤ 20 Male Kerala * Viral infection
Table 4: Data after using k-anonymity
Simply outputting every record k times will satisfy k-anonymity.
Meyerson and Williams [12] demonstrated that optimal k-anonymity is a NP-
hard problem, and although there are heuristic methods that often yields practical
results, they are not optimal.
2.1.2 l-diversity
We have seen that k-anonymity is susceptible to many attacks. l-diversity tries
to solve this problem. The book Privacy-Preserving Data Mining – Models and
Algorithms (2008) [7] defines l-diversity as being:
Let a q*-block be a set of tuples such that its non-sensitive values
generalize to q*. A q*-block is l-diverse if it contains l ”well
represented” values for the sensitive attribute S. A table is l-diverse, if
every q*-block in it is l-diverse.
The paper t-closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity [6] defines l-
diversity as being:
An equivalence class is said to have l-diversity if there are at least l
“well-represented” values for the sensitive attribute. A table is said to
have l-diversity if every equivalence class of the table has l-diversity.
2.1.3 t-closeness
t-closeness is a further refinement of l-diversity group based anonymization that
is used to preserve privacy in data sets by reducing the granularity of a data
representation.
The original paper by Ninghui Li, Tiancheng Li, and Suresh Venkatasubramanian
[6] defines t-closeness as:
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An equivalence class is said to have t-closeness if the distance between
the distribution of a sensitive attribute in this class and the distribution
of the attribute in the whole table is no more than a threshold t. A table
is said to have t-closeness if all equivalence classes have t-closeness.
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [8] formalizes the idea that a query should not reveal whether
any person is present in a data set, much less what their data is.
A simple example used in social sciences is to ask a person to answer the question
“Do you own the attribute A?”, according to the following procedure:
1. Throw a coin.
2. If head, then answer honestly.
3. If tail, then throw the coin again and answer “Yes” if head, “No” if tail.
If the attribute A is synonymous with illegal behavior, then answering “Yes” is not
incriminating but, overall, these data with many responses are significant, since
positive responses are given to a quarter by people who do not have the attribute
A and three-quarters by people who actually possess it. Thus, if p is the true
proportion of people with A, then we expect to obtain:
(1/4)(1− p) + (3/4)p = (1/4) + p/2
positive responses. Hence, it is possible to estimate p.
As Dwork says in the book The Algorithm Foundation of Differential Privacy,
2013, the concerns with other approaches to anonymize data are:
• Data Cannot be Fully Anonymized and Remain Useful : The richer the data,
the more interesting and useful it is. However, the richness of the data
enables “naming” an individual by a sometimes surprising collection of fields,
or attributes, such as the combination of zip code, date of birth, and sex,
or even the names of three movies and the approximate dates on which an
individual watched these movies. This “naming” capability can be used in a
linkage attack to match “anonymized” records with non-anonymized records
in a different dataset.
• Re-identification of “Anonymized” Records is Not the Only Risk : Re-
identification of anonymized data records is clearly undesirable, because the
record may contain compromising information that could cause harm.
• Queries Over Large Sets are Not Protective: Questions about specific
individuals cannot be safely answered with accuracy. Forcing queries to
be over large sets is not a panacea, as shown by the following differencing
attack. Suppose it is known that Mr. X is in a certain medical database.
Taken together, the answers to the two large queries “How many people in
the database have the sickle cell trait?” and “How many people, not named
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X, in the database have the sickle cell trait?” yield the sickle cell status of
Mr. X.
• Query Auditing Is Problematic: One might be tempted to audit the sequence
of queries and responses, with the goal of interdicting any response if, in light
of the history, answering the current query would compromise privacy. The
auditor may be on the lookout for pairs of queries that would constitute a
differencing attack. There are two difficulties with this approach: First, it
is possible that refusing to answer a query is itself disclosive. Second, query
auditing can be computationally infeasible.
• Summary Statistics are Not “Safe”: the failure of summary statistics as
a privacy solution concept is immediate from the differencing attack just
described.
• “Ordinary” Facts are Not “OK”: Revealing “ordinary” facts, such as
purchasing bread, may be problematic if a data subject is followed over
time.
• “Just a Few”: In some cases a particular technique may in fact provide
privacy protection for “typical” members of a data set, or more generally,
“most” members. In such cases one often hears the argument that the
technique is adequate, as it compromises the privacy of “just a few”
participants.
To continue talking about differential privacy, some concepts should be defined
first [13]:
• Dataset: A Dataset d is a collection of records from a Universe U . If we
were collecting data about flip coins of three individuals, we would have the
universe U = head, tail and our dataset d would have two entries, dhead = i
and dtail = j, where i+ j = 3.
• Distance: The distance measures how many records differ between two
databases. In the previous example, the distance between two different
datasets x and y can be defined with the l1 norm:
||x− y||1 =
|U |∑
i=1
|xi − yi|
• Mechanism: A mechanism is an algorithm that takes a dataset as input
and returns an output. If mechanism C counts the number of individuals
in the dataset, then C(d) = 3 in this example. In practice we will consider
randomized mechanisms, where the randomization is used to add privacy
protection.
Now, we can define Differential Privacy as:
Theorem 1 A mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy if for every pair of
datasets x, y such that the distance between x and y, ||x− y||1 ≤ 1 and for every
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subset S ⊆ Range(M) [8]:
Pr[M(x) ∈ S]
Pr[M(y) ∈ S] ≤ e

It is important to clarify that this is just a definition, not an algorithm. That
means that it is just a condition that must be satisfied by a mechanism to claim
that it satisfies  differential privacy.
Let’s check if the previous example satisfies 1-differential privacy. As a reminder,
we were given a mechanism C, counting the number of individuals in a dataset
composed by data about flip coins of three individuals.
Given the previous definition, we would need to prove that C satisfies:
Pr[C(x) ∈ S]
Pr[C(y) ∈ S] ≤ e
1
In this case, it is easy to find a counter example. Given x, y such that the distance
||x − y||1 = 1 (the dataset x contains one more record than the dataset y) and
||x||1 = k (the dataset x contains k records), then:
Pr[C(x) = k]
Pr[C(y) = k]
≤ e⇒ 1
0
≤ e
As the probability of C(x) containing k records is 1, and therefore the probability
of C(y) containing k records is 0.
According to Dwork [8], the key qualities of Differential Privacy are:
1. Protection against arbitrary risks.
2. Automatic neutralization of linkage attacks.
3. Quantification of privacy loss. It is possible to measure the privacy loss in
differential privacy and compare different techniques to determine which one
provides better accuracy or better privacy.
4. Composition. Mechanisms can easily be composed assuming that the
mechanisms operate independently given the data. Let d be a dataset and g
an arbitrary function. Then, the sequential composition theorem asserts that
if MI(d) is i differentially private, then M(d) = g(M1(d),M2(d), ...,MN(d))
is
∑N
i=1 i differentially private.
5. Group Privacy.
6. Closure Under Post-Processing. Differential Privacy is immune to post-
processing: A data analysis without additional knowledge about the private
database cannot compute a function of the output of a differential private
algorithm and make it less differential private.
Now that we have a notion of what Differential Privacy means and what it
tries to achieve, it is time to apply it to a real world example using two
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different mechanisms, a variation of the initial example, the randomized response
mechanism, and the Laplace mechanism.
2.2.1 The Randomized Response Mechanism
The example used to illustrate how Differential Privacy works can be extended as
shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: MR(d, α, β):
1. Flip a biased coin with probability of heads α;
2. If heads, then answer truthfully with d;
3. If tails, flip a coin with probability of heads β and answer “yes” for heads
and “no” for tails.
To estimate the proportion p of participants whose answer is “yes” we have to
do some changes to our previous estimation method, given that now the coin is
biased. We know that:
P (Xi = 1) = αp+ (1− α)β
Solving for p we get:
p =
P (Xi = 1)− (1− α)β
α
Given a sample of size n , we can estimate P (Xi = 1) with
∑i=n
i=1 Xi
n
. Then, the
estimate pˆ of p is:
pˆ =
i=n∑
i=1
Xi
n
− (1− α)β
α
Now that we can estimate the proportion of positive answers for a population, it
will be interesting to know the accuracy of our estimation. For this we can use the
variance assuming that each response is independent:
Var(pˆ) = Var
(∑i=n
i=1 Xi
nα
)
=
Var(Xi)
nα2
If we take the square root of the variance it is possible to determine the standard
deviation s of pˆ, which is proportional to 1√
n
, since the other factors are not
dependent on the number of participants. Multiplying both pˆ and s by n yields
the estimate of the number of participants that answered “yes” and its relative
accuracy expressed in number of participants, which is proportional to
√
n.
We can also calculate the level of differential privacy. Let’s imagine we have a
dataset d with two configurations, dyes, containing the positive answers each one
represented by a 1, and dno, which contains the negative answers represented by
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a 0. We know that ||di − dj||1 ≤ 1 for any i, j, as defined by Differential Privacy.
If we apply that definition to our mechanism we get:
Pr[MR(di, α, β) = k]
Pr[MR(dj, α, β) = k]
≤ e
Replacing i and j by our configurations, we can calculate the level of differential
privacy for our mechanism d:
Pr[MR(dyes, α, β) = 1]
Pr[MR(dno, α, β) = 1]
≤ e
ln
(
α + (1− α)β
1− (α + (1− α)β)
)
≤ 
ln
(
α + β − αβ
1− (α + β − αβ)
)
≤ 
The level of differential privacy is represented by  and can be tuned varying the
parameters α and β. For a level of ln 3 we can set α = 1
2
and β = 1
2
(this is, the
same probability of getting head or tail, which is the original example using an
unbiased coin).
2.2.2 The Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism adds Laplace noise from the Laplace distribution centered
at 0 with scale b = 1

Lap(x|b) = 1
2b
e−
|x|
b
So it can be defined as:
ML(x, f, ) = f(x) + Y
where f is a function and Y is a random variable drawn from
Lap(b) = Lap(
1

)
Following the same procedure used with the Randomized Response mechanism, we
need to prove that the Laplacian Mechanism preserves  Differential Privacy.
Given two datasets x, y such that ||x − y||1 ≤ 1, as stated by the definition of
Differential Privacy, and a function f which returns a real number from a dataset,
let px denote the probability density function of ML(x, f, ) and py the probability
density function of ML(y, f, ). We can compare the two of them at some arbitrary
point z:
px(z)
py(z)
=
e−|f(x)−z|
e−|f(y)−z|
= e(|f(x)−z|−|f(y)−z|) ≤ e|f(x)−f(y)|
Then,
e|f(x)−f(y)| ≤ e
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It is also possible to compute the accuracy of the Laplace mechanism. As said
before, Y ∼ Lap(b), then Pr[|Y | ≥ t × b] = e−t. Hence, let k = ML(x, f, ) and
∀δ ∈ (0, 1]:
Pr
[
|f(x)− k| ≥ ln
(
1
δ
)
× 1

]
= Pr
[
|Y | ≥ ln
(
1
δ
)
× 1

]
= δ
The accuracy in the Laplace mechanism, unlike in the randomized response, does
not depend on the number of participants n.
2.2.3 Randomized Response and Laplace mechanism: Compari-
son
So far, we have seen two different mechanisms that meet Differential Privacy.
In this section we will see how the same query can be answered by different
mechanisms with the same level of Differential Privacy.
Choosing the right Differential Privacy mechanism depends on the problem to
solve. Different mechanisms differ in the accuracy of the results, the performance,
or whether they require the original dataset or not.
Let’s imagine we perform a study on n individuals. In this study we want to know
how many of those individuals possess some property p. We can represent each
individual with a Bernoulli random variable.
The Randomized Response mechanism would be represented as MR(d,
1
2
, 1
2
). It
satisfies ln 3 differential privacy, as we have proved previously. On the other hand,
the Laplace mechanism would be represented as ML(d, f, ln 3), which also satisfies
ln 3 differential privacy.
Although both mechanisms satisfies the same level of differential privacy, MR
is applied to each individual response and combined later into a single result,
while ML is applied directly to the entire dataset. This means that if the Laplace
Mechanism is used, the original data should be collected first, and then differential
privacy is applied to the aggregated data, in such a way that the possibility that
an attacker might get access to it exists.
In contrast, the Randomized Response mechanism applies the noise directly to the
individual responses of the users and only the noisy responses are collected. With
this mechanism, any individual’s information cannot be learned with certainty,
but an aggregator can still infer population statistics.
But as everything in Computer Science, this is a matter of tradeoffs. Although both
mechanisms satisfy the same level of differential privacy, ML needs the original
data, but the accuracy of the results is also higher.
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Figure 1: Accuracy using the Randomized Response mechanism. [13]
Figure 2: Accuracy using the Laplace mechanism. [13]
Which mechanism to use depends, as it has been said, on several factors. In the
medical field, for example, one may trust data collectors but not the community
who will be accessing the data. The Laplacian mechanism would be appropriate in
this case. Nonetheless, in the online world, users try to protect their privacy and
do not trust in the companies that collect their data, so the Randomized Response
mechanism would be preferred even if it provides less accuracy.
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2.3 RAPPOR
RAPPOR [10] stands for Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal
Response. It is an algorithm developed at Google to collect data while preserving
the privacy of its users adding random noise to guarantee Differential Privacy.
It is based on the Randomized Response mechanism explained in 2.2.1
The algorithm is divided in two parts: the data collection and anonymization, and
the decoding and analysis.
The parameters used are:
• Size of the Bloom filter, k: RAPPOR uses a Bloom filter to report the
data. When selecting the bloom filter size we should have in mind how many
unique values are expected.
• Number of hash functions, h: Bloom filters use hash functions, that
map data of arbitrary size to data of fixed size. In this case from a string of
characters to an index in the Bloom filter, to encode the values.
• Number of cohorts, m: To avoid collisions, RAPPOR divides the
population into different cohorts. This value must be chosen carefully. If
it is too small, collisions are still quite likely, while if it is too large then each
individual cohort provides insufficient signal due to its small sample size.
• Probabilities p, q, f : Noise is added to the Bloom filter with different
probabilities. These probabilities determine the level of Differential Privacy
along with the number of hash functions used.
2.3.1 Data collection and anonymization
The data collection and anonymization consists of four steps that are further
explained: 1. Collect and encode the original data. 2. Permanent Randomized
Response. 3. Instantaneous Randomized Response. 4. Send the encoded
data.
Collect and encode the original data
RAPPOR encodes strings of characters into a Bloom Filter. This Bloom filter
never leaves the client.
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What is a Bloom Filter
RAPPOR encodes the values into a Bloom Filter. But, what is a Bloom Filter,
and why is it used?
A Bloom Filter is a probabilistic data structure used to test whether an element
belongs to a set. False positive matches are possible, but false negatives are not.
It is represented as a bit array of m bits, all set to 0. There must be also k hash
functions that map or hash some set of elements to one of the m array positions.
To add an element, hash it using the k hash functions to get k positions in the
array. Afterwards, set the bits corresponding to that positions to 1.
To check if an element is in the Bloom filter, hash it using the k hash functions
to get k positions in the array. Check if all those positions contain the bit set to
1. If they are, that element may be present in the Bloom filter. It can be the case
that the bits have by chance been set to 1 during the insertion of other elements,
resulting in a false positive.
To do this, h hash functions are used to encode the value into the Bloom Filter B
of size k.
In order to use small Bloom filters, the users are assigned to a cohort randomly,
and each cohort implements a different set of h hash functions.
Permanent Randomized Response
The bits of the Bloom filter are set to 0 or 1 with probability f/2, or remains
unchanged with probability 1− f . The resulting Bloom filter should be stored in
the client and used in the future if the client needs to report the same value more
than once.
In other words, for each client’s value v and bit i, 0 ≤ i < k in B, create a binary
reporting value B′i which equals to:
B′i =

1, with probability 1
2
f
0, with probability 1
2
f
Bi, with probability 1− f
Instantaneous Randomized Response
The Instantaneous Randomized Response is computed using the probabilities p
and q. The resulting Bloom filter will have the bit in position i set to 1 with
probability q if its value was 1 in the Permanent Randomized Response, or with
probability p if its value was 0.
P (Si = 1) =
{
q, if B′i = 1
p, if B′i = 0
Send the encoded data
The resulting data from the previous step is sent for analysis. In Figure 3 we can
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see an example of how the encoding mechanism of RAPPOR works.
Figure 3: Example of how RAPPOR encodes a value. The client value of the
string “The number 68” is hashed onto the Bloom filter B using h (here 4) hash
functions. For this string, a Permanent randomized response B′ is produced and
memoized by the client, and this B′ is used (and reused in the future) to generate
Instantaneous randomized responses S (the bottom row), which are sent to the
collecting service. Source: RAPPOR, Google, 2014.
2.3.2 Data decoding and analysis
After clients have generated their randomized responses, they send them to a
server. This server has the task of aggregating the reports and figuring out which
answers were actually given, and how often. To do this, we make use of statistical
techniques.
The bit arrays are the only information we get from the clients. However, because
of the Bloom filter, there are generally infinitely many answers that lead to the
same bits being set. This means that we need some set of answers that we explicitly
check for. We call this the candidate set. What values are used as candidates is
completely dependent on the data that we are collecting.
Of course we know what bits would be set when hashing these candidate values. If
we would also know how often each bit was truly set in the original Bloom filters,
before noise was added, then we could model this problem using an equation
system. In this system, we are looking for candidate counts so that the bits set
equal the true number of times the individual bits were set. In statistics, this
corresponds to a regression problem.
Estimating the counts of bits
Of course, the whole point of differential privacy is that we do not have access
to the original set of bits, so we cannot directly solve this hypothetical equation
system. But what we can do is to figure out estimates for how often the bits
were set. This is possible because we can estimate how much noise was added
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on average. Going into detail for the exact formulas do not help much to build
intuition, and they can be found in [10].
While this approach of making estimates might sound a bit messy, it actually has
a fairly good theoretical backing. By the law of large numbers 1, the estimate will
converge to the true counts with an increasing amount of data. This also explains
one very important constraint when using differential privacy: We need a lot of
users to make sense of the data. In order to make the estimates more accurate, we
will need more users. On the other hand, we cannot control for the random noise
well enough if we do not have a good amount of data.
After having estimated how often bits were changed for the randomized response,
we can compute estimates for how often the bits were set in the original Bloom
filter. We’ll call these estimates our target vector y. Note that this only gives
us information about how often bits were set in total, across all users. We have
absolutely no clue about which users had the bits set in their original Bloom
filter.
Example
To give a more concrete idea of where we are going with this, we can stop for a
moment and consider this simple example. Let’s say we use a Bloom filter with
three bits and two hash functions. After having received the randomized reports
from enough users, we estimate the following true bit counts:
• bit 1: 3000
• bit 2: 4000
• bit 3: 1000
We are collecting data where each client can give exactly one answer out of the
possible answers a, b and c. These values correspond to our candidate set. When
hashing the candidate values, the following bits would be set:
• a: bits 1, 2 would be set
• b: bits 1, 3 would be set
• c: bits 2, 3 would be set
Given this information, we are looking for counts of how often the answers a, b or
c were given so that we arrive at the estimated numbers for the individual bits.
The important inside here is that this is an equation system:
• bit 1: counta + countb = 3000
• bit 2: counta + countc = 4000
• bit 3: countb + countc = 1000
Note how this is not just any kind of equation system, it is a linear equation
system. This is great as there are many well-known ways to solve linear equation
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law of large numbers
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systems. The straightforward solution for this specific system is that answer a was
given 3000 times, b was never given, while c was given 1000 times.
Of course this is a very simple and artificially constructed example, it is just meant
to showcase the problem that the RAPPOR analysis is being reduced to.
Creating the data matrix X
Linear equation systems can generally be well presented using matrices and vectors.
We already described out target vector y earlier. What is left to talk about is the
data matrix X. This matrix encodes what bits are set when candidate values are
hashed in different cohorts.
The general idea here is that for each bit and cohort we add a row to the matrix
and for each candidate value we add a column. A cell then has value 1 if the
corresponding bit is set when hashing the corresponding candidate value in the
respective cohort. Otherwise, it has value 0.
In the above simple example, where we have no cohorts, X would look like
this: 1 1 01 0 1
0 1 1

Now, our linear equation system can be described by X ∗ b = y where b gives us
the candidate counts that explain the set bits.
Linear regression
Usually, we cannot directly solve this equation system. One reason is that y
only contains estimates and that our candidate set might be incomplete. This
means that the equation system might not have a perfect solution and that we
are generally only looking for an approximate one. However, this is still a fairly
standard problem in statistics and is usually solved by fitting a linear regression
model.
The other problem is that our system does not entirely consist of linear equations.
It would not make sense to have negative counts. Thus, b may only contain non-
negative values. This makes the problem a fair bit harder to solve, but again it is
not a completely new problem. There are some implementations of non-negative
least squares solvers available that allow us to find the best approximate solution
to a linear equation system with the non-negativity constraint.
Significance tests
It is worth keeping in mind that we are only operating on estimates and that some
hash collisions are possible. There are many different approximations for the linear
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equation system and it is not clear whether candidates with very small counts were
actually reported in the original Bloom filters.
All of this need a statistical significance tests. Computing p-values for linear
regression coefficients is a standard practice and is usually done using t-tests. We
can use one-sided t-tests because the non-negativity constraint means that extreme
results are only possible in one direction.
A significance level of 0.05 to filter out candidate values that do not have enough
evidence for their associated counts is used. Because there might be a lot of
candidate values, a Bonferroni corrected significance level is used. Finally, only
the candidate values and frequencies that we have enough confidence in are
reported.
2.3.3 RAPPOR Variants
There are three different variants of this algorithm depending on how many times
the data is submitted from a client and the number of unique values:
• One-time RAPPOR: The data is sent only once by client. This
version does not require longitudinal privacy protection. The Instantaneous
randomized response step can be skipped in this case and a direct
randomization on the true client’s value is sufficient to provide strong privacy
protection
• Basic RAPPOR: If the set of unique values is small, it is possible to map
them to a single bit in the bit array, so it is not necessary to use a Bloom
filter with several hash functions.
• Basic One-time RAPPOR: This third variant is the combination of the
previous ones. One round of randomization using a deterministic mapping
of strings into their own unique bits. It is the simplest version of RAPPOR.
2.4 Applications of Differential Privacy
Several companies are applying differential privacy to collect data efficiently. Uber
[14] introduced a technique for efficiently calculating the sensitivity of a query
without requiring changes to the database. They call it Elastic Sensitivity and it
applies differential privacy to SQL queries. In contrast with RAPPOR, it does not
use local differential privacy, as the original data is still collected and saved in the
database.
Apple [15] also uses Differential Privacy to collect usage data in iOS. They use a
similar approach to the one shown in RAPPOR, in which they collect data using
local differential privacy applying an algorithm called Private Count Mean Sketch
algorithm, and this data is sent to a server, where it is analyzed.
Google uses RAPPOR [10] to collect usage data in its browser, Chrome 2. It was
2http://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/rappor
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the fist commercial deployment of differential privacy.
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3 Objectives
In this section, the goals that we are trying to achieve with this project are
explained along with how we expect to achieve them. First, we will show what
we want to achieve with RAPPOR, and later, how we want to implement this
algorithm in Firefox and why.
Now that the State of the Art has been exposed, we understand that for most of
the situations, removing identifiers from the data is not enough to ensure privacy.
We have also seen that there is a novel research field called Differential Privacy
that claims to solve the stated problems.
Most of the applications and research in Differential Privacy have been done with
academic purposes in mind, but the industry is starting to develop Differential
private mechanisms to collect data. One of this mechanisms is RAPPOR.
This section is divided in two parts, each one explaining a different objective of
this thesis. First, we will study how differential privacy and RAPPOR work, and
later, we will implement a solution using this technique.
3.1 Working with Differential Privacy through RAP-
POR
Unfortunately, the real world is different to the academic world, and research that
shows promising results in a controlled environment can behave differently when
applied in a real world situation.
The first objective of this project is to simulate RAPPOR and demonstrate that
it can be applied to collect data from real users.
The goal of this simulations is:
• Determine the correct parameters: As we have explained in Section 2.3,
RAPPOR has several parameters that need to be tuned. These parameters
affect the performance and accuracy of the results. The correct parameters
can make a noticeable difference.
• Determine the minimum number of clients needed: One of the main
purposes of the simulations is to determine how many clients are needed
to get useful results. This is important because the data we are collecting
contains noise and the underlying distribution can only be inferred if we have
enough data.
• Determine the expected accuracy of the data: Given a certain number
of clients and an approximation of the unique values expected, what is the
accuracy we should expect? This is an important question, as we need to
know how much we can trust in the results obtained.
• Determine the best level of Differential Privacy: The correct value for
the level of Differential Privacy is still an open question. Nobody really knows
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what is the best value to guarantee privacy and have a good performance.
We will then assume that the value of this parameter depends on the problem
to solve, and we will try to come up with the best value for our problem.
3.2 Build a SHIELD Study for Firefox
The second objective is to implement RAPPOR in Firefox. Firefox is a web
browser used by millions of people every day. One of their premises is that they
care about the privacy of their users. Nonetheless, they also need data to improve
their products. They already collect anonymous data 3, but they cannot collect
data that could potentially identify a user.
Using Differential Privacy and RAPPOR, we would be able to collect more
sensitive data, such as top sites users visit and how features perform on specific
sites, while ensuring privacy, in a unbiased way, as the user would not need to give
explicit consent.
The add-on developed will collect effective top-level domain and the domain name
(eTLD+1), e.g. facebook.com or google.co.uk. with the idea of answering these
questions:
• Which top sites are users visiting? – If the most visited sites are known,
Firefox can be optimized to work better in those sites.
• Which sites using Flash does a user encounter? – Knowing how frequent a
user finds a site using deprecated technologies such as Flash can help Mozilla
to take decisions.
3.3 Use Cases
A use case is a methodology used in system analysis to identify, clarify, and organize
system requirements.
ID UC-XX
Title
Actor
Preconditions
Description
Table 5: Use Cases template
All the use cases that will be covered will be specified in individual tables following
the template in the Table 5. Each of the use cases will receive a unique identifier
of the format UC-XX, where XX is a double digit number. This identifier will be
used later on different matrices to trace requirements.
3https://wiki.mozilla.org/Firefox/Data Collection
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ID UC-01
Title Simulate RAPPOR
Actor User
Preconditions The user has the RAPPOR simulator installed and all
the required dependencies.
Description The user executes the RAPPOR simulator with the
parameters (distribution, number of clients, number
of unique values, values per client, probabilities and
cohorts) they want.
Table 6: Use Case UC-01. Simulate RAPPOR
ID UC-02
Title Simulate RAPPOR and get statistics
Actor User
Preconditions The user has the RAPPOR simulator installed and all
the required dependencies.
Description The user executes the RAPPOR simulator with the
parameters (distribution, number of clients, number
of unique values, values per client, probabilities and
cohorts) they want. Useful statistics are shown at the
end of the simulations (total variation distance, false
positive rate, false negative rate, number of detected
values).
Table 7: Use Case UC-02. Simulate RAPPOR and get statistics
ID UC-03
Title Run several RAPPOR simulations and get statis-
tics
Actor User
Preconditions The user has the RAPPOR simulator installed and all
the required dependencies.
Description The user executes the RAPPOR simulator with the
parameters (distribution, number of clients, number
of unique values, values per client, probabilities and
cohorts) they want for several simulations. Useful
statistics are shown at the end of the simulations (total
variation distance, false positive rate, false negative
rate, number of detected values) comparing the different
simulations.
Table 8: Use Case UC-03. Run several RAPPOR simulations and get statistics
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ID UC-04
Title Send user’s homepage eTLD+1 encoded with
RAPPOR
Actor Browser
Preconditions The user has Firefox installed, it allows Mozilla to run
studies, and the RAPPOR study is installed.
Description The add-on gets the user’s homepage, extracts the
eTLD+1 and encodes the value with RAPPOR.
Table 9: Use Case UC-04. Send user’s homepage eTLD+1 encoded with RAPPOR
ID UC-05
Title Simulate RAPPOR in Firefox
Actor User
Preconditions The user has Firefox installed, it allows Mozilla to run
studies, and the RAPPOR study is installed.
Description A simulation is run in the add-on inside Firefox with
generated values to test that the algorithm is working
as expected.
Table 10: Use Case UC-05. Simulate RAPPOR in Firefox
3.4 Requirements
Now that the Use Cases have been defined, we can define the requirements, both
functional and non-functional. A functional requirement is any requirement which
specifies what the system should do. In contrast, a non-functional requirement
specifies how the system performs a certain function.
Every functional requirement, that specifies a function that has to be offered by
the simulator and the add-on, will be tagged using an unique identifier with the
format FR-XX, where the XX represent a double digit number.
ID FR-XX || NFR-XX
Title
Description
Priority
Use-case(s)
Table 11: Requirements template
Every non-functional requirements, associated with preconditions or other context
necessary for the add-on and the simulator to work correctly, will be identified
with the tags NFR-XX, where the XX stands for a double digit number.
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3.4.1 Functional Requirements
ID FR-01
Title Use MD5 as hash function
Description The original values have to be encoded into a Bloom
filter using a hash function. MD5 is a well-known
hashing algorithm.
Priority High
Use-case(s) UC-01, UC-02, UC-03, UC-04, UC-05
Table 12: Functional Requirement FR-01. Use MD5 as hash function
ID FR-02
Title Use SHA256 as hash function
Description The original values has to be encoded into a Bloom filter
using a hash function. SHA256 is a well-known hashing
algorithm.
Priority High
Use-case(s) UC-01, UC-02, UC-03, UC-04, UC-05
Table 13: Functional Requirement FR-02. Use SHA256 as hash function
ID FR-03
Title Encode correctly the eTLD+1 of the homepage
Description The algorithm should encode correctly in a bit string the
value of the eTLD+1 of the user’s homepage in Firefox.
Priority High
Use-case(s) UC-04, UC-05
Table 14: Functional Requirement FR-03. Encode correctly the eTLD+1 of the
homepage
ID FR-04
Title Send a Telemetry ping with the encoded value
Description The Firefox extension sends a Telemetry ping with the
encoded information.
Priority High
Use-case(s) UC-04, UC-05
Table 15: Functional Requirement FR-04. Send a Telemetry ping with the
encoded value
32
Differential Privacy in the browser
ID FR-05
Title Generate plots showing the original and the
detected distributions
Description Generate two plots showing the original and detected
distributions to visually see the accuracy of the algo-
rithm.
Priority High
Use-case(s) UC-02, UC-03
Table 16: Functional Requirement FR-05. Generate plots showing the original
and the detected distributions
ID FR-06
Title Compute the total variation distance among two
distributions
Description One of the metrics to compute should be the total
variation distance.
Priority High
Use-case(s) UC-02, UC-03
Table 17: Functional Requirement FR-06. Compute the total variation distance
among two distributions
ID FR-07
Title Compute the number of detected values using
RAPPOR
Description Offer the number of detected values to determine how
accurate is the algorithm.
Priority High
Use-case(s) UC-02, UC-03
Table 18: Functional Requirement FR-07. Compute the number of detected values
using RAPPOR
ID FR-08
Title Compute the false positive rate
Description Show the false positive rate of the detected values.
Priority Medium
Use-case(s) UC-02, UC-03
Table 19: Functional Requirement FR-08. Compute the false positive rate
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ID FR-09
Title Compute the false negative rate
Description Show the false negative rate of the detected values.
Priority Medium
Use-case(s) UC-02, UC-03
Table 20: Functional Requirement FR-09. Compute the false negative rate
ID FR-10
Title Generate a plot showing the total variation
distance between several simulations
Description Show the total variation distance among several simula-
tions to see how the accuracy varies.
Priority Medium
Use-case(s) UC-02, UC-03
Table 21: Functional Requirement FR-10. Generate a plot showing the total
variation distance between several simulations
ID FR-11
Title Generate a plot showing the false positive rate
among several simulations
Description Show the false positive rate among several simulations
to see how the accuracy varies.
Priority Medium
Use-case(s) UC-02, UC-03
Table 22: Functional Requirement FR-11. Generate a plot showing the false
positive rate among several simulations
ID FR-12
Title Generate a plot showing the false negative rate
among several simulations
Description Show the false negative rate among several simulations
to see how the accuracy varies.
Priority Medium
Use-case(s) UC-02, UC-03
Table 23: Functional Requirement FR-12. Generate a plot showing the false
negative rate among several simulations
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3.4.2 Non-functional Requirements
ID NFR-01
Title Operating System for the simulator
Description The simulator can be used out of the box in macOS.
Priority High
Table 24: Non-Functional Requirement NFR-01. Operating System for the
simulator
ID NFR-02
Title Operating System for the study
Description The study can run in any operating system that
supports Firefox.
Priority High
Table 25: Non-Functional Requirement NFR-02. Operating System for the study
ID NFR-03
Title Firefox requirements
Description The study can run only if the user allows Firefox to run
studies.
Priority High
Table 26: Non-Functional Requirement NFR-03. Firefox requirements
ID NFR-04
Title Firefox version
Description The study has been tested in Firefox 57+.
Priority High
Table 27: Non-Functional Requirement NFR-04. Firefox version
ID NFR-05
Title Python version
Description The simulator requires Python 2.7 installed.
Priority High
Table 28: Non-Functional Requirement NFR-05. Python version
ID NFR-06
Title R version
Description The simulator requires R 3.4.3 installed.
Priority High
Table 29: Non-Functional Requirement NFR-06. R version
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3.4.3 Use Cases to Requirements Traceability Matrix
For a better understanding of the relationship between use cases and requirements,
a visual representation in form of traceability matrix is provided. This matrix
shows the functional requirements in the rows and the use cases in the columns,
to determine which requirements are supposed to satisfy which use cases. The
non-functional requirements are not shown in this matrix, as they are stated as
preconditions for the system to work as expected.
In Table 30 it is possible to see that all the requirements match two or more use
cases, which means that the formulation of the use cases is correct.
UC-1 UC-2 UC-3 UC-4 UC-5
FR-01 X X X X X
FR-02 X X X X X
FR-03 X X
FR-04 X X
FR-05 X X
FR-06 X X
FR-07 X X
FR-08 X X
FR-09 X X
FR-10 X X
FR-11 X X
FR-12 X X
Table 30: Requirement - Module traceability matrix
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4 Simulations
As discussed before, before the implementation, a set of simulations must be
performed.
This section contains the simulations performed to ensure that the algorithm works
as expected, to know how each parameter affects the performance and accuracy of
the algorithm, and to select the appropriate parameters for collecting the data in
a real world application.
The simulations will be divided in Purpose of the simulation, in where the
motivation of the simulation will be explained, Expected result, where the results
that we expect to obtain are discussed, and Obtained result, where the obtained
results are analyzed.
The simulator is based on the one Google built to test RAPPOR [16], although
multiple changes have been introduced, such as support for macOS, and parallel
execution to speed up the simulations.
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Figure 4: Simulator architecture. [16]
In this simulator, the data is first generated, and then the simulation is executed,
creating several files containing the output of the simulation and information about
the parameters. In a second step, the data is analyzed and an image comparing
the original and the RAPPOR distributions is created.
As it has been explained in Section 2.3, there are several parameters we need to
tune to get the optimal results. These parameter are:
• Size of the bloom filter, k.
• Number of clients.
• Number of unique values.
• Values per client.
• Number of hash functions, h.
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• Number of cohorts, m.
• Probabilities p, q, f .
4.1 Input and Output
The first step to perform in the simulations is the data generation. The input data
for RAPPOR is:
• Value to encode: The value we want to submit in a differential private
manner. For the simulations, these values will be randomly assigned to
each client following a selected distribution.
• Cohort: Cohort the user belongs to. The cohorts should be randomly
assigned and uniformly distributed across the population.
Alongside these two values, our generated data will also contain an identifier
of the client that has submitted the data for debugging purposes. In the real
implementation, no data capable of identifying a user should leave the client.
1 client ,cohort ,value
2 c1 ,0,v19
3 c2 ,1,v54
4 c3 ,2,v56
5 c4 ,3,v56
6 c5 ,4,v79
7 c6 ,5,v28
8 c7 ,6,v62
9 c8 ,7,v46
10 c9 ,8,v51
Listing 1: Example of generated data used as input.
The output of the simulations consists of the client, the cohort, the original bloom
filter, the permanent randomized response and the instantaneous randomized
response. The client, original bloom filter and permanent randomized response
are written in the output for debugging. In a real implementation, these values
should remain private.
1 client ,cohort ,bloom ,prr ,irr
2 c1 ,1 ,10100000 ,10100000 ,10001000
3 c2 ,2 ,00001100 ,00001100 ,00101000
4 c3 ,3 ,01000010 ,01000010 ,00001000
5 c4 ,4 ,10000010 ,10000010 ,10011010
6 c5 ,5 ,11000000 ,11000000 ,01000010
7 c6 ,6 ,10000001 ,10000001 ,10011010
8 c7 ,7 ,00001001 ,00001001 ,10001011
9 c8 ,8 ,01000100 ,01000100 ,11010000
10 c9 ,9 ,00001001 ,00001001 ,01101100
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Listing 2: Example of the output data.
4.2 Evaluation of the results
To evaluate the results obtained in the simulations, first it is necessary to define a
metric.
The results will be evaluated based on the values detected by RAPPOR, the false
negative rate, and the Total Variation (TV) distance. The total variation distance
measures the difference between the ground truth and the values detected by
RAPPOR. In other words, it’s the L1 distance between the actual and RAPPOR
distributions.
4.2.1 Size of the bloom filter
• Purpose of the simulation: Determine how the size of the bloom filter
affects the accuracy of the results.
• Expected result: According to the RAPPOR paper [10], different sizes
perform similarly depending on the values of h and m. Then, the expected
result is that with different values of h (number of hash functions) and m
(number of cohorts), different sizes of bloom filters will return uncorrelated
results, making it not possible to determine the optimal size of the bloom
filter.
• Obtained result: The number of strings detected by RAPPOR seems to
increase when the size of the bloom filter increases until it reaches 32 bits,
as it can be seen in the case of sim bloom filter 1 gauss small in Figure
5, where the number of detected strings grows from 59 out of 100 (4 bits
used) to 78 out of 100 (256 bits used) and therefore, the Total Variation
distance decreases. At this point, the accuracy seems to converge (when the
size of the bloom filter is small, the collisions are quite likely, but when this
size increases, the collisions decreases until it converges, this is, not improve
anymore), or even worsen (in sim bloom filter 4 gauss small) as the size
of the bloom filter increases. Also, the time it takes to execute RAPPOR
increases with the size of the bloom filter. This simulation has been done with
100 unique values and number of hash function (h) of 2 and 4. Increasing the
number of hash functions, consumes privacy budget (eventually decreasing ),
this loss in privacy budget can be offset by increasing client-side noisification.
However, the additional cost of this operation is a decrease in fidelity of the
obfuscated data relative to the true underlying data. This allows us to
decrease the size of the bloom filter in order to address practical constraints
by increasing the number of hash functions.
– for 1 hash function:
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∗ for a False Positive Rate of 1%: k = 100 ∗ n
– for 2 hash functions:
∗ for a False Positive Rate of 1%: k = 20 ∗ n
∗ for a False Positive Rate of 0.1%: k = 60 ∗ n
NOTE: n is the number of unique values in a given cohort, not across the
entire population. If we estimate the number of unique eTLD+1 values set
as homepages in the wild to be 100K. The use of only 1 hash function is
intractable.
This plots show the value of the Total Variation distance across different
simulations.
Figure 5: Accuracy when size of the bloom filter k increases.
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Figure 6: Accuracy when size of the bloom filter k increases.
4.2.2 Number of clients
• Purpose of the simulation: How many clients are needed to obtain an
accurate result.
• Expected result: The larger the number of clients is, the more accurate
are the results. We expect that with a small number of clients, the results
are not accurate, being the total variation close to 0.5 and with a high false
negative rate. These results are expected with all distribution types.
• Obtained result: The larger the number of clients (and data submitted) is,
the lower is the total variation between the original data and the RAPPOR
data. Also, the number of false negatives increases when the number of
clients (and total data submitted) decreases. Two different distributions
have been tested, gauss and exp. With 25K clients (and as each client
reports 1 value, 25K values) the false negative rate is around 80%, with
a total variation distance that lies in between 0.3 and 0.5. When we increase
the number of clients, we get that in the case of the Gaussian distribution,
with 500K values reported, a false negative rate of 38% is obtained, along
with a TV distance of 0.1. In contrast, using the exponential distribution,
with the same number of values (values = clients ∗ valuesperclient) we get
a false negative rate of around 50% but with a TV distance of 0.1. These
means that we are getting a good approximation, and although the false
negative rate is high (which means that a lot of values has not been detected
by RAPPOR), this values are the least important ones. The important
values, the ones with higher frequency, are detected and well approximated.
With 10M values, in both distributions we get a good approximation of the
original data, in which most of the values are detected by RAPPOR (around
80%), and the TV distance lies between 0.02 and 0.03. In conclusion, if
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the purpose of RAPPOR is getting an idea of the trending or most used
values (ex. eTLD + 1, etc) users have, a population of 500K is enough for
100 unique values. (For a more detailed explanation of how the number of
unique values affect the accuracy, see the next simulation). If we want to get
a good approximation of the data, the minimum population needed would
more than 1M, with 10M reporting accurate results. For now, we can say
that the minimum population size needed for a result with a false negative
rate between 10% and 20% is totalV alues ∗ 100000 with totalV alues being
the number of values reported (clients ∗ valuesperclient).
This plots show the value of the Total Variation distance across different
simulations.
Figure 7: Accuracy when decreasing the number of clients.
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Figure 8: Accuracy when decreasing the number of clients.
4.2.3 Number of unique values
• Purpose of the simulation: Maximum number of unique values to get a
good result.
• Expected result: Given a constant number of clients (and therefore, values
reported), the lower the number of unique values is, the more accurate are
the results.
• Obtained result: As expected, when the number of unique values increases,
the accuracy of the results decreases. With 1M clients and 10 unique values,
the RAPPOR results are almost perfect. When the number of unique values
is increased, the accuracy rapidly decreases. With 250 unique values reported
by 1M clients, we can detect the trends but we cannot trust the individual
values. With more than 250 unique values (0.00025% of the total number of
values reported), the results are invalid. The results are slightly better when
an exponential distribution is used. Although the Gaussian distribution
returns better Total variance score than the exponential, the trends in the
results are easier to identify using the exp. distribution. With 10M clients,
the trending values can be detected when having up to 750 values, but if we
want accurate results, 250 unique values is the bottom limit. With 500 unique
values we get a better approximation than with 750, but once again, we
should not trust the frequency of these results and only use them to identify
the trending values. With more than 750 unique values (0.000075% of the
total number of values reported), the results are invalid. The conclusion of
this simulation is that, adding unique values is expensive in terms of clients
(or values reported) that are needed to get an accurate approximation.
In Basic One-Time RAPPOR, a general rule of thumb is that we can reliably
detect sqrt(N)/10 strings with N being the sample size. This gives us an
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upper bound for the number of strings that can be detected in other variants
of RAPPOR.
4.2.4 Values per client
• Purpose of the simulation: How the number of values reported by each
client affects the result.
• Expected result: The larger the amount of data is, the more accurate
the results are. They should be very similar to the ones obtained in the
simulation of the number of clients.
• Obtained result: As expected, the results are almost identical to the
ones obtained in Number of clients. We can determine then that, it does
not matter how many clients are reporting results, but the amount of data
reported. (In the case of one-time RAPPOR, each client reports one value,
so clients and values in this context are the same) (Note: in this case, each
client reports several and different values, not the same value over and over).
4.2.5 Number of hash functions
• Purpose of the simulation: How the number of hash functions affects the
results.
• Expected result: The number of hash functions indicates how many bits
in the bloom filter are used to report a value. This is, if the number of hash
functions is 2, the bloom filter will have two bits set to 1 in the real reported
value (more bits will be set to 1, and some of the original bits will be changed
to 0 in the PRR and IRR steps). If the number of hash functions is high,
it is very likely that the value of some bits will be changed in the PRR and
IRR steps, reporting the original value fewer times.
• Obtained result: The result matches the one obtained in the RAPPOR
paper (section 4) [10]. The best results are obtained with 2 hash functions,
increasing the accuracy from 1 to 2 hash functions, and showing a decrease
in this metric when the number of hash functions increases. This has
been tested with both exponential and Gaussian distributions, and different
number of clients and unique values. The intuition of why this happens is
unclear, although it may be due to the probability of a bit being changed
in the PRR and IRR steps, as explained in Expected Result. In short, this
simulation confirms the results obtained in the RAPPOR paper.
This plot shows the value of the Total Variation distance across different
simulations.
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Figure 9: Accuracy when increasing the number of hash functions, h.
Figure 10: Values detected using 2 hash functions.
46
Differential Privacy in the browser
Figure 11: Values detected using 4 hash functions.
4.2.6 Number of cohorts
• Purpose of the simulation: How the number of cohorts affects the
accuracy of the results.
• Expected result: Cohorts implement different sets of h hash functions for
their Bloom filters, thereby reducing the chance of accidental collisions of two
strings across all of them. The choice of m should be considered carefully,
however. When m is too small, collisions are still quite likely, while when m
is too large, then each individual cohort provides insufficient signal due to its
small sample size (approximately N/m, where N is the number of reports).
• Obtained result: Using both Gaussian and exponential distributions with
1M values and 100 unique values, we can see that when the number of cohorts
reaches 16, it converges (at least it does not get better or worse testing with
up to 256 cohorts). The same results are obtained with 10M clients and 100
unique values. If we increase the population to 10M clients with 1K unique
values, the accuracy increases until we reach 128 cohorts. If we double it and
we use 256 cohorts, RAPPOR is not able to detect any value. In conclusion,
the number of cohorts should be chosen carefully keeping in mind how many
clients we are expecting and the number of unique values.
This plot shows the value of the Total Variation distance across different
simulations.
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Figure 12: Accuracy when increasing the number of cohorts, m.
Figure 13: Detected values using 100 unique values, 1000000 clients, 1 value per
client, 4 cohorts.
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Figure 14: Detected values using 100 unique values, 1000000 clients, 1 value per
client, 128 cohorts.
4.2.7 Probabilities
• Purpose of the simulation: Testing if, maintaining the same level of DP,
changing the parameters p, q and f impacts in the accuracy of the results.
• Expected result: The important value is the level of Differential Privacy
(in the Appendix you can see how it is calculated), but with the same level
of DP, the accuracy of the results should be similar.
• Obtained result: As expected, the value that affects directly the accuracy
of the results is the level of DP. For this simulation a level of 2 ∗ ln(3)DP
has been used, varying the probabilities p, q and f . With 1M clients and 100
unique values, testing with both gauss and exp distributions, we obtain a
Total Variation distance that lies between 0.075 and 0.1, and a false negative
rate quite constant. These results indicate that the value for the optimal
probabilities p, q and f is unclear, but, as expected, the level of DP should
be chosen carefully. On one hand, it has to be strong enough to protect the
user, on the other hand, it has to report accurate results that we can analyze.
This plot shows the value of the Total Variation distance across different
simulations.
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Figure 15: Accuracy when varying the values of probabilities p, q, f.
4.3 Conclusions of the Simulations
These simulations have been performed in a controlled environment, with
generated data. The main purpose of this is to confirm that the algorithm works
as expected. In a real world situation, in which the ground truth is not known,
the results can be different.
• Values needed: The obvious answer is as much as possible. But a lower
bound is needed. This lower bound depends on other parameters, such as
the number of cohorts, the number of unique values. The higher is the
number of unique values, the higher the number of values reported should
be. Depending on the purpose of the simulation, we can have two situations:
– We want to see the most used values in the data: We do not really care
about the frequency of a value in the data, but if these value appears,
and how this value is related with other values reported. In this case,
as we can see in the second simulation, with 500K values reported and
100 unique values (0.0002%) it can be enough.
– We want a good approximation of the data: Here, the more values
reported, the better. With 10M values reported and 100 unique
values (0.00001%), we get a good approximation, as seen in the second
simulation.
• If each client only sends the value once, one-time RAPPOR can be used.
The results with one-time RAPPOR are supposed to be more accurate, and
the complexity of the algorithm is reduced, as the IRR step is skipped.
• The optimum number of hash functions is 2.
• The number of cohorts should be chosen carefully. When the number of
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cohorts is too small, then collisions are still quite likely, while when it is too
large, then each individual cohort provides insufficient signal due to its small
sample size (approximately N/m, where N is the number of reports). it is
better to have a high number of cohorts, because as shown in the simulation,
when the number of cohorts is too small, the results obtained are useless, but
when it increases, the results get better, and in some situations, it converges.
We must not forget, however, that a large number of cohorts will result in
no detected values.
• The values of the probabilities p, q and f doesn’t really matter. What matters
is the level of Differential Privacy. It should be chosen taking into account
that if the level of DP is strong, the noise in the data could be too high, but
if it is too weak , the privacy of the user can be compromised.
• For this project we have decided to choose the parameters p and q in a way
that p and q are fully dependent, this is, q = 1 − p. Moreover, these values
will be chosen solely on the desired value of  (level of DP). For future work,
we should study better the relationship between p and q, and how these
values can be optimized to create a strong algorithm in terms of privacy
guarantee, but that also generates accurate results.
4.4 Parameter selection
The parameters that are going to be used in the Firefox add-on are:
• Values per client: 1 – Each client will submit only one value.
• Cohorts, m: 100 – According to the expected number of unique values, 100
cohorts should return good results.
• Bloom filter bits k: 128 – 128 bit Bloom filter combined with the number
of cohorts should be enough to collect the required data.
• Hash functions, h: 2 – As shown in the simulations, two hash functions
return the best results.
• Probability p: 0.35
• Probability q: 0.65
• Probability f : 0.0
• Differential Privacy level, : The level of Differential Privacy is 2.476. It
can be calculated using the values chosen previously.
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5 Development
This section will explain the development of the add-on for Firefox implementing
RAPPOR and the decisions that were made during the development process.
5.1 Implementation
Extensions add new functionalities to Firefox. They can add anything from a
toolbar button to a completely new feature. For this extension, we will not include
any visual element, as it is not needed.
Extensions are developed using JavaScript, an interpreted programming language
developed for Netscape, the precursor of Firefox. This extension is implemented
as a Shield study.
5.1.1 Description of the files
• HomepageStudy.jsm: implements the logic to extract the eTLD+1 from the
preference and apply RAPPOR.
• TelemetryRappor.jsm: implements the RAPPOR algorithm and the related
utility functions.
• StudyUtils.jsm: miscellaneous Shield utils.
• bootstrap.js: contains add-on specific boilerplate code.
5.1.2 Description of architecture
This add-on is structured as a restartless (bootstrap.js) extension.
During bootstrap.js:startup(data, reason):
1. shieldUtils imports and sets configuration from Config.jsm.
2. Modules are imported.
3. Study is set up.
4. RAPPOR is executed.
5. boostrap.js waits for requests from HomepageStudy.jsm that are study
related: ["info", "telemetry", "endStudy"].
6. Data is sent to Telemetry.
7. The study ends and the add-on is uninstalled.
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5.1.3 Data format
1 {
2 "type": "shield -study -addon",
3 ... common ping data
4 },
5 "payload": {
6 "version": <int > // 3,
7 "study_name": <string > // "TelemetryRAPPOR",
8 "branch": <string > // "eTLD+1",
9 "addon_version": <string > // "1.0.0" ,
10 "shield_version": <string > // "4.0.0" ,
11 "type": <string > // "shield -study -addon",
12 "data": {
13 "attributes": {
14 "cohort": <string > // "6",
15 "report": <string > // "180504828
f142c0204000004010346c0"
16 }
17 },
18 "testing": false
19 },
20 ... ping data
21 }
Listing 3: Format of the data sent by the add-on.
• payload.version: This field contains the version of the payload.
• payload.study name: This field contains the name of the study, as set in
Config.jsm.
• payload.branch: This field contains the branch of the experiment. In this
case, the experiment has only one branch.
• payload.addon version: This field contains the version of the addon, as
set in package.json.
• payload.shield version: This field contains the version of the Shield study
add-ons library.
• payload.type: This field contains the type of the payload. In this case,
shield-study-addon.
• payload.data.attributes.cohort: This field contains the cohort to which
a client belongs to.
• payload.data.attributes.report: This field contains the RAPPOR value
of the user’s homepage.
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5.1.4 Shield Study
Shield Studies is a function that prompts a random population of users to help
Mozilla try out new products, features and ideas. They are installed as a self-
expiring add-on on a certain population (usually, 1% or 2%) of Firefox users.
They are a special type of restartless extension, and need to be signed to run in
Firefox 42+.
Obtain the data The first step is to get the data. As a reminder, we want to
submit the eTLD + 1 of the homepage. First, we need to obtain the homepage.
Once we have this value, it has to be converted to a URI object. Now, it is possible
to obtain the value we are looking for. The code for this can be seen in Listing
4.
1 const PREF_HOMEPAGE = "browser.startup.homepage";
2 homepage = Services.prefs.getComplexValue(PREF_HOMEPAGE , Ci.
nsIPrefLocalizedString).data;
3
4 let uriFixup = Cc["@mozilla.org/docshell/urifixup ;1"].
getService(Ci.nsIURIFixup);
5 homepageURI = uriFixup.createFixupURI(homepage , Ci.
nsIURIFixup.FIXUP_FLAG_NONE);
6
7 eTLD = Services.eTLD.getBaseDomain(homepageURI);
Listing 4: Getting the homepage.
This can fail if the host is an IP address or is if it empty when calling
Services.eTLD.getBaseDomain. In such case, the study ends. For example, if
the value stored in the preference is foo.bar.com the add-on applies RAPPOR to
bar.com and then sends the anonymized bit field out. Other possibility is that the
user’s homepage is about:home or other about: page. In the case of about:home,
this is the value we use. In the case of other about: page, the reported value is
about:pages.
Encode the data So far, we have the value we want to submit. This value has
to be encoded into a Bloom filter. For this, we have to use a hash function that
maps a value to a position in the Bloom filter. Two different encoding methods
have been developed using two different hash functions, MD5 and SHA256.
Although is well known that MD5 is not a secure hash function we can use it in
this case. The original Bloom filter never leaves the client (in this case, Firefox),
and random noise is added, thus an attacker cannot use this fact to decode the
data.
In Listing 5 and Listing 6 we can see how to encode the value using MD5 and
SHA256.
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1 /**
2 * Hash client ’s value v (string) onto the Bloom filter B of
size k (in bytes) using
3 * h hash functions and the given cohort.
4 * @param {string} value - Value to encode.
5 * @param {integer} filterSize - Size of the bloom filter.
6 * @param {integer} numHashFunctions - Number of hash
functions.
7 * @param {integer} cohort - Cohort.
8 */
9 function encodeMD5(value , filterSize , numHashFunctions ,
cohort) {
10 let bloomFilter = new Uint8Array(filterSize);
11 let hash = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/hash;1"].
createInstance(Ci.nsICryptoHash);
12
13 // Seed the hash function with the cohort and the hash
function number. Since we
14 // are using a strong hash function we can get away with
using [0..k] as seed
15 // instead of using actually different hash functions.
16 hash.init(Ci.nsICryptoHash.MD5);
17 let seed = String.fromCharCode(cohort);
18 let data = bytesFromUTF8(seed + value);
19 hash.update(data , data.length);
20 let result = hash.finish(false);
21 for (let i = 0; i < numHashFunctions; i++) {
22 let idx = result.charCodeAt(i);
23 // Set the corresponding bit in the bloom filter. Shift 3
bits to select the index , as k is
24 // represented in bytes , we need to shift 3 bits to get
the corresponding bit (1 byte = 8 bits = 2^3).
25 setBit(bloomFilter , idx % (filterSize << 3));
26 }
27 return bloomFilter;
28 }
Listing 5: Encoding the value using MD5
1 /**
2 * Hash client ’s value v (string) onto the Bloom filter B of
size k (in bytes) using
3 * h hash functions and the given cohort.
4 * @param {string} value - Value to encode.
5 * @param {integer} filterSize - Size of the bloom filter.
6 * @param {integer} numHashFunctions - Number of hash
functions.
7 * @param {integer} cohort - Cohort.
8 */
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9 function encodeSHA256(value , filterSize , numHashFunctions ,
cohort) {
10 let bloomFilter = new Uint8Array(filterSize);
11 let data = bytesFromUTF8(value);
12 let hash = Cc["@mozilla.org/security/hash;1"].
createInstance(Ci.nsICryptoHash);
13 for (let i = 0; i < numHashFunctions; i++) {
14 hash.init(Ci.nsICryptoHash.SHA256);
15 // Seed the hash function with the cohort and the hash
function number. Since we
16 // are using a strong hash function we can get away with
using [0..k] as seed
17 // instead of using actually different hash functions.
18 let seed = bytesFromOctetString(cohort + "" + i);
19 hash.update(seed , seed.length);
20 hash.update(data , data.length);
21 let result = hash.finish(false);
22 // The last 2 bytes of the result as the bit index is
sufficient for bloom filters
23 // of up to 65536 bytes in length.
24 let idx = result.charCodeAt(esult.length - 1) | (result.
charCodeAt(result.length - 2) << 8);
25 // Set the corresponding bit in the bloom filter. Shift 3
bits to select the index , as k is
26 // represented in bytes , we need to shift 3 bits to get
the corresponding bit (1 byte = 8 bits = 2^3).
27 setBit(bloomFilter , idx % (filterSize << 3));
28 }
29 return bloomFilter;
30 }
Listing 6: Encoding the value using SHA256
Permanent Randomized Response
It is important to note that for the implementation, we have decided to represent
the Bloom filter using a Uint8Array. This is an array formed by unsigned integers
of 8 bits. It means that the length of the Bloom filter in bits is a multiple of 8.
The permanent randomized response is stored in the client. This is done
because if we want to submit the same value more than once, it is possible
to compute a new instantaneous randomized response from the permanent
randomized response.
Instead of storing directly the PRR, a secret is generated when the add-on is
initialized the first time and it is stored in the preference of the browser. Now, it
is possible to recover the PRR on the fly without storing it.
1 /**
2 * Computes the Permanent randomized response.
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3 * @param {Uint8Array} bloomFilter - Bloom filter containing
the true value encoded.
4 * @param {float} f - Probability f.
5 * @param {string} secret - Secret to initialize the PRNG.
6 * @param {string} name - name of the metric.
7 */
8 function getPermanentRandomizedResponse(bloomFilter , f,
secret , name) {
9 // Uniform bits are 1 with probability 1/2, and fMask bits
are 1 with
10 // probability f. So in the expression below:
11 // - Bits in (uniform & fMask) are 1 with probability f
/2.
12 // - (bloom_bits & ~fMask) clears a bloom filter bit with
probability
13 // f, so we get B_i with probability 1-f.
14 // - The remaining bits are 0, with remaining probability
f/2.
15 let filterSize = bloomFilter.length;
16 let uniform = new Uint8Array(filterSize);
17 let fMask = new Uint8Array(filterSize);
18 // Calculate the number of bits in the array.
19 let bits = filterSize * 8;
20 // The value of threshold128 is the maximum value for which
the byte from the digest
21 // is true (1) or false (0) in the bloom filter.
22 let threshold128 = f * 128;
23 // As Chrome we diverge from the paper a bit and don’t
actually randomly
24 // generate the fake data here. Instead we use a
permanently stored
25 // secret (string), the name of the metric (string), and
the data itself
26 // to feed a PRNG.
27 let prng = makePRNG(secret + "\0" + name + "\0" +
bytesToHex(bloomFilter));
28 // Get a digest with the same length as the number of bits
in the bloom filter.
29 let digestBytes = prng(bits);
30 for (let i = 0; i < bits; i++) {
31 // Calculate the index of the bit to set. This must be
done because
32 // we have to set individual bits to one or zero , but
what we have are bytes.
33 let idx = Math.floor(i/8);
34
35 // uBit is true (1) if it’s odd. False if even. Then ,
probability of
36 // being 1 is 1/2.
37 // 1 bit of entropy.
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38 let uBit = digestBytes[i] & 0x01;
39 uniform[idx] |= (uBit << i % 8);
40
41 // digestBytes[i] is a byte , with range 0 - 255.
42 // we need a number between 0 and 127, so the last
43 // bit of digestBytes[i] is discarded.
44 let rand128 = digestBytes[i] >> 1; // 7 bits of entropy
45 // Check if the value is less than the maximum value for
which
46 // the byte from the digest is true.
47 let noiseBit = (rand128 < threshold128);
48 fMask[idx] |= (noiseBit << i % 8);
49 }
50 return mask(fMask , bloomFilter , uniform);
51 }
Listing 7: Permanent Randomized Response
Instantaneous Randomized Response
Finally, the Instantaneous Randomized Response is computed with the probabili-
ties p and q. For this, we generate two bit arrays whose bits are 1 with probabilities
p and q. Then, those two bit arrays are merged with the Permanent Randomized
Response computed in the previous step as follows:
irr[i] = (pGen[i] & ∼prr[i]) | (qGen[i] & prr[i]);
1 /**
2 * Create an instantaneous randomized response , based on the
previously generated
3 * Permanent Randomized Response
getPermanentRandomizedResponse , and using the
probabilities p and q.
4 * - If the Permanent Randomized Response (PRR) bit is 0,
the Instantaneous Randomized Response (IRR)
5 * bit is 1 with probability p.
6 * - If the Permanent Randomized Response (PRR) bit is 1,
the Instantaneous Randomized Response (IRR)
7 * bit is 1 with probability q.
8 * @param {Uint8Array} prr - Permanent Randomized Response/
9 * @param {float} p - Probability p.
10 * @param {float} q - Probability q.
11 */
12 function getInstantRandomizedResponse(prr , p, q) {
13 let filterSize = prr.length;
14 // Get a array whose bits are 1 with probability p.
15 let pGen = getBloomBits(p, filterSize);
16 // Get a array whose bits are 1 with probability q.
17 let qGen = getBloomBits(q, filterSize);
18 // Generate the IRR.
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19 return mask(prr , pGen , qGen);
20 }
Listing 8: Instantaneous Randomized Response
1 /**
2 * Returns a bloom filter whose bytes are 1 with a given
probability.
3 * @param {float} prob - Probability of a bit to be 1.
4 * @param {integer} filterSize - Size of the bloom filter.
5 */
6 function getBloomBits(prob , filterSize) {
7 let arr = new Uint8Array(filterSize);
8 // Calculate the number of bits in the array
9 let bits = filterSize * 8;
10 for (let i = 0; i < bits; i++) {
11 // Check whether a random number is higher or not than
the given probability.
12 let bit = getRandomFloat () < prob;
13 // Calculate the index of the bit to set. This must be
done because
14 // we have to set individual bits to one or zero , but
what we have are bytes.
15 let idx = Math.floor(i/8);
16 // Set the corresponding bit in the bloom filter to its
value. We’re using here
17 // the boolean ’bit’ as an int (1 if true , 0 if false).
18 arr[idx] |= (bit << (i % 8));
19 }
20 return arr;
21 }
Listing 9: Set the corresponding bits in the bloom filter.
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6 Testing
In this section the testing methodology is explained. It contains two sections, first,
the unit tests, and later, the simulations.
6.1 Unit tests
Unit testing is a software testing method by which individual units of source code
are tested to determine whether they are fit for use.
There are several characteristics a unit test should meet:
• A unit test does not depend on the environment.
• A unit test does not depend on other unit tests.
• A unit test does not depend on external data.
• A unit test does not have side effects.
• A unit test asserts the results of your code.
• A unit test tests a single unit of work.
• A unit test runs fast.
Unit tests also provide confidence when making changes to the code, as they ensure
that, if a change breaks some functionality, when the unit tests are executed, they
will fail showing the error in an early stage of the development. This is important
when working with interpreted languages such as JavaScript, because the code is
not compiled, so there is no compiler to perform checks before actually running
it.
The unit tests performed in this project test all the functions and do not rely on
randomness. The tests are:
• test mask equals: Checks that merging two bloom filters applying a mask
returns the expected result.
• test mask not equals: Checks that merging two bloom filters applying a
mask returns the expected result.
• test bytesFromOctetString equals: Checks that converting from a String
into an array of bytes returns the expected result.
• test bytesFromOctetString not equals: Check that converting from a
String into an array of bytes returns the expected result.
• test bytesToHex equals: Checks the conversion between an array of bytes
and and hexadecimal.
• test bytesToHex not equals: Checks the conversion between an array of
bytes and and hexadecimal.
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• test setBit equals: Checks that setting a bit in a bloom filter returns the
expected result.
• test setBit not equals: Checks that setting a bit in a bloom filter returns
the expected result.
• test getBit true: Checks that a bit is set in a bloom filter.
• test getBit false: Checks that a bit is not set in a bloom filter.
• test encode equals: Checks that encoding a string into a bloom filter
returns the expected result.
• test encode not equals: Checks that encoding a string into a bloom filter
returns the expected result.
6.2 Simulation inside Firefox
Due to the randomness involved in this algorithm, it is difficult to cover all possible
cases with unit tests. The best way to ensure that everything is working as
expected is to run a simulation inside the add-on and compare the obtained results
with a simulation previously executed with the simulator.
To implement the add-on simulator, a flag was added to the extension. If called
with this flag set to simulation, the extension will read one of the data files used
in the simulation section, applying RAPPOR to all the values contained in the file
and writing a report file that can be later imported in the simulator for further
analysis.
This analysis is the same one used in the simulation section, and will show the
exact same information and metrics.
Due to the aforementioned randomness, both simulations are not going to be
completely equal, but we can still see if they are similar and show that the accuracy
does not vary too much.
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7 Project Organization and Management
This section contains three aspects that needed to be planned beforehand to
start working efficiently: Time management, methodology, and Version control
system.
7.1 Time Management
Due to the size of this project, for an efficient use of time and resources, it has to
be carefully planned beforehand. In Figure 16 we can see a Gantt diagram showing
the different stages of the projects and the time spent for the expected duration
of the project, 9 months.
We can observe in the Gantt that we expect to achieve two milestones:
• Parameter selection: Selecting the adequate parameters for the problem
we are trying to solve. This implies that the simulations have been executed
and we have some conclusions and an idea on how the different parameters
affect the accuracy and performance of the algorithm.
• Version 1.0.0 of the add-on: This is the end of the project. Develop a
functioning add-on that can collect data and send it respecting differential
privacy.
There are other important phases. In “Analysis” we analyze the simulator and
the algorithm. In “Design”, the simulations are defined, and later run during the
“Simulations” step. Afterwards, during “Implementation” the Firefox add-on is
implemented, and later tested.
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Figure 16: Gantt chart for the project.
7.2 Methodology
The methodology used in this project is the Waterfall model. In this model
each phase must be completed before the next phase can begin and there is no
overlapping in the phases.
It was selected because in this project, we have different but well defined phases
that must be completed in order. The requirements are needed for the simulations,
and the results of the simulations are used in the implementation of the add-
on. Finally, the add-on is tested executing a simulation, that depends on the
implementation and the simulator.
7.3 Version Control and Bug Tracker
To manage the code of this project, a Version Control System (VCS) has been
used. After studying different alternatives, such as Git, Mercurial and Subversion,
the chosen system for the project is Git.
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Git is a free and open source distributed version control system. Its Open Source
philosophy really fits this project, but it has been chosen because of the features
it offers:
• Speed.
• Data integrity.
• Support for distributed, non-linear workflows.
Git also offers a really powerful branching model. Every repository have a default
branch (usually called master). From this branch, new branches can be created,
where developers can work on new features and ideas that will be later merged
back to the default branch. This branching model allows a great flexibility and it
really eases the development process.
In this project we have used a modified version of git-flow [17]. The master branch
contains the production code that is always shippable. In other words, it contains
the latest stable version of the code. For new features, a new branch is created
from master, and it is later merged back when the feature is ready. The original
git-flow system also suggests to use a develop branch from which features branches
are created, but as there is only one developer in this project, it would add extra
complexity that can be avoided.
Now that we have a version control system, we need a bug tracker to track the
progress. Given that this is a project intended to be used at Mozilla, the natural
option to chose is Bugzilla. Bugzilla is a web-based general-purpose bug tracker
and testing tool originally developed and used by the Mozilla project, and licensed
under the Mozilla Public License.
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8 Legal Framework and Socioeconomic Con-
text
In this part of the document, the legal and economic implications of the project
are discussed.
8.1 Legal Framework
This section includes the laws and restrictions that apply to the data collected by
the Firefox add-on.
8.1.1 Ley Orga´nica 15/1999 de Proteccio´n de Datos de Cara´cter
Personal (LOPD)
The Ley Orga´nica 15/1999 de Proteccio´n de Datos de Cara´cter Personal (LOPD)
is a Spanish organic law on the protection of personal data. It was approved in
1999.
Its principal objective is to regulate the personal data regardless of where they are
used, and the rights and duties on this data. This law affects all data referring to
people.
Particularly, in this project these regulations would not apply, as we are not
collecting personal data. Nonetheless, it is important to know that this law exists
and it does not apply to this project. Every data related application that collects
data must check whether there are regulations that apply to the data that is being
collected.
8.1.2 Data collection at Mozilla
Mozilla balance their goal of collecting useful, high-quality data with their goal to
give users meaningful choice and control over their own data. Their commitment
to data collection is grounded in:
• Necessity: Collect only as much data as necessary.
• Privacy: Give users meaningful choices and control over their own data.
• Transparency: Make decisions about data collection public and accessible.
• Accountability: Assign accountability for the design, approval, and
implementation of data collection.
There are two necessary roles for any project collecting data:
• Data requester: The person requesting data to be collected.
• Data steward: The person who ensures the data collection process is
followed and that requested data complies with Mozilla policies.
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Data requesters start the process by creating a bug/issue and completing a request
form, which requires them to answer questions like why does Mozilla need to collect
data, how much data is necessary, how long will it be collected. The request is
publicly available, as are any comments and approvals.
Data stewards review each request to ensure that it is documented fully and to
assign the data collection to one of this four privacy categories:
1. Technical data: Information about the machine or Firefox itself.
2. Interaction data: Information about the user’s direct engagement with
Firefox.
3. Web activity data: Information about user web browsing that could be
considered sensitive.
4. Highly sensitive data: Information that directly identifies a person, or if
combined with other data could identify a person.
The data collected by this project lies in the third category.
8.1.3 Open Source
As the intention of this project is to build an add-on that can be used by Mozilla
to run a study, the easiest and most obvious decision to achieve it is to make the
project Open Source.
The first step to make a project Open Source is to find a suitable license to offer
enough freedom to anyone who want to use the code.
In this case, the license selection was a straightforward process. The one that fits
the purpose of this purpose better is the Mozilla Public License 2.0.
This license grants:
Permissions of this weak copyleft license are conditioned on making
available source code of licensed files and modifications of those files
under the same license (or in certain cases, one of the GNU licenses).
Copyright and license notices must be preserved. Contributors provide
an express grant of patent rights. However, a larger work using the
licensed work may be distributed under different terms and without
source code for files added in the larger work.
Permissions
• Commercial use: This software and derivatives may be used for
commercial purposes.
• Modification: This software may be modified.
• Distribution: This software may be distributed.
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• Patent use: This license provides an express grant of patent rights from
contributors.
• Private use: This software may be used and modified in private.
Limitations
• Liability: This license includes a limitation of liability.
• Trademark use: This license explicitly states that it does not grant
trademarks rights.
• Warranty: This license explicitly states that it does not provide any
warranty.
Conditions
• Disclose source: Source code must be made available when the software is
distributed.
• License and copyright notice: A copy of the license and copyright notice
must be included with the software.
• Same license (file): modifications of existing files must be released under
the same license when distributing the software.
8.2 Socioeconomic Context
8.2.1 Budget
The budget of this project is divided in two main categories:
• Direct Costs: This includes items such as software, equipment, labor and
raw materials along with personal costs.
• Indirect Costs: Indirect costs go beyond the costs associated with creating
a particular product to include the price of maintaining the entire company.
In this case, we have decided to have a fixed indirect cost of 10% of the direct
costs.
This project has been done by a single person, but we can differentiate several
roles.
Position e/ Hour Hours invested Cost
Project Manager 30 180 5,400 e
Developer 20 250 5,000 e
Quality Control 15 80 1,200 e
Total 11,600 e
Table 31: Personnel costs
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We have to account also the imputable costs in equipment and infrastructure. The
time span of this project is 9 month. This is important to calculate the imputable
costs for each item.
Item Total Price Life Span Imputable Cost
MacBook Pro (Retina, 15-inch) 3,305.59 e 48 months 367.28 e
GitHub developer account 7 e/ month 9 months 63 e
Total 430.28 e
Table 32: Equipment costs
The complete budget of the project can be calculated adding the previously
computed costs. To this amount, we also sum a 10% to cover the indirect
costs.
Concept Total
Personnel Costs 11,600 e
Equipment Costs 430.28 e
Indirect Costs 1,203.02 e
Project Costs 13,233.30 e
Table 33: Project costs
In Table 33 is possible to see a summary of the costs, that sum up to 13,233.30 e.
A 10% for both risk (additional money used for unexpected expenses) and benefits
must be added. The final cost of the project taking this into account is
15,879.96 e.
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9 Conclusions
Differential Privacy is a really novel field of study, whose applications in production
environments have just started. This technique has shown promising results,
as showed in this thesis, collecting data while preserving the privacy of those
submitting it.
The main purpose of this thesis was to investigate about Differential Privacy and
create a solution that can be used on production to collect data respecting the
privacy and anonymity of Firefox users. First, RAPPOR, the chosen algorithm,
was validated thanks to the simulations. These simulations showed interesting
results when tuning the parameters, and we managed to choose the best parameters
for the purpose of our study: obtaining the eTLD+1 of the user’s homepage.
The simulations also showed that differential privacy is not suitable for all privacy
related problems. Those problems which need accurate data, e.g, data for medical
studies, cannot benefit from differential privacy, because the results that can be
inferred from the data are only approximations. Moreover, the amount of data
needed to obtain a good approximation is unknown, and although it can be
estimated thanks to simulations, real-world data is sometimes unpredictable and
behave differently as expected.
In addition, the data that is being collected has to be understood. This is because
to decode the data, a list of possible submitted values has to be used, and to
obtain a good performance and accuracy, the parameters must be tuned taking
into account what data we expect.
Algorithms like RAPPOR offer good performance and accuracy if the parameters
are properly tuned, but this is just the beginning of differential privacy outside of
the academic world, and we will see great improvements in the techniques used in
the coming years.
The key motivation of this project was to start from an academic research,
and using the scientific method in the simulation process, starting from a
hypothesis, executing the experiment and validating or refuting the results,
selecting the correct values for the parameters, that finally were used in a real-
world implementation.
As a personal conclusion of the author, the knowledge acquired in this project is
priceless and it tries to sum up everything learned at the university, both academic
and professional-wise.
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10 Future work
This project, as it has been said several times in this thesis, is far from done.
Differential privacy is a very novel field of study and it still has important problems
that must be solved, and there is plenty of room for it to improve.
One of the main problems is that some implementations like RAPPOR require a
set of candidate values to be able to decode the submitted data. Several research
have been done on this, resulting in a new version of RAPPOR [18] that does
not need this candidate set of values, at the cost of requiring way more values to
be submitted, and decreasing the accuracy of the results. Implementing this was
considered outside the scope of this thesis, as the number of values required to
obtain an approximation is sometimes intractable.
An open question in this field is the real meaning of the differential privacy level,
. It is known that the lower this value, the more privacy, but although some
research have been done [19] [20], there is still no rigorous method for choosing
the key parameter , which controls the crucial trade-off between the strength of
the privacy guarantee and the accuracy of the published results.
We have seen during this thesis that the most time consuming and tedious
process has been the simulations. Choosing the correct parameters is difficult,
and the key task for obtaining the correct results, as the implementation of the
algorithm is generic and can be used to anonymize any data. An interesting
improvement would be to build a program that automatically runs simulations
tuning the parameters until the best ones are selected. This problem is elementally
hard, but an interesting approach that can be used is genetic algorithms. They
are used to obtain solutions to optimization and search problems by relying on
bio-inspired operators such as mutation, crossover and selection. Choosing a
good representation of the parameters, they can be mutated and combined over
multiple generations until the most correct values for the problem to solve are
obtained.
Finally, one interesting application of these methods can be used in machine
learning. Trying to learn accurate patterns from differential private, and therefore,
inaccurate data, is a challenge. It is already being studied [21] [22], and
applying machine learning to sensitive data that must be anonymized would allow
researchers to access more interesting data.
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Glossary
• Python: Python is an interpreted high-level programming language for
general-purpose programming. Created by Guido van Rossum and first
released in 1991.
• Homebrew: Homebrew is a free and open-source software package
management system that simplifies . the installation of software on Apple’s
macOS operating system
• SHA256: SHA256 is a cryptographic hash function designed by the United
States National Security Agency (NSA) that uses a 256 bit digest.
• MD5: The MD5 algorithm is a widely used hash function producing a 128-
bit hash value.
• Firefox: is a free and open-source web browser developed by Mozilla
Foundation and its subsidiary, Mozilla Corporation.
• R: R is a free programming language and software environment for statistical
computing and graphics that is supported by the R Foundation for Statistical
Computing.
• eTLD+1: It is a catalog of certain Internet domain names. The Mozilla
Foundation maintains suffix list for the security and privacy policies of its
Firefox web browser, though it is available for other uses under the Mozilla
Public License.
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Appendix A: Calculate level of Differential Pri-
vacy in RAPPOR
1 = h log
q∗(1− p∗)
p∗(1− q∗)
p∗ = P (Si = 1|bi = 1) = 1
2
f(p+ q) + (1− f)q
q∗ = P (Si = 1|bi = 0) = 1
2
f(p+ q) + (1− f)p
Appendix B: Install Firefox
• Install Homebrew:
/usr/bin/ruby -e "$(curl -fsSL
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install)"
• Install Firefox:
brew cask install firefox
Appendix C: Running a simulation
First, the dependencies must be installed:
./setup.sh
In general, any simulation or set of simulations can be run as follows:
./regtest.sh run-seq ’regexp’
The format of regexp is: distribution-size-config. The values this parameters can
take are:
Distribution
• unif - Uniform distribution
• exp - Exponential distribution
• gauss - Gaussian (normal) distribution
• zipf1 - Zipf distribution with parameter 1
• zipf1.5 - Zipf distribution with parameter 1.5
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Population size
• tiny - 100 unique values, 1000 clients, 1 value per client
• small - 100 unique values, 1000000 clients, 1 value per client
• medium - 100 unique values, 10000000 clients, 1 value per client
• large - 100 unique values, 100000000 clients, 1 value per client
• clients[1-6] - Parameters used to test the number of clients. 100 unique
values, 25K, 50K, 100K, 500K, 1M, 10M clients, 1 value per client.
• values[1-6] - Parameters used to test the number of values per client. 100
unique values, 25K clients, 1, 2, 4, 20, 40, 400 values per client.
• unique[1-9] - Parameters used to test the number of unique values. 10, 50,
10
Config (bloom filter params, RAPPOR params, fraction of
extra values, regexp for missing values)
The config parameter contains the configuration for the test. This is, the
candidates, and the params for the bloom filter and RAPPOR that is explained
in the following sections.
• typical – ’8x128x2’, ’params1’, .2, ’10
• sharp – ’8x128x2’, ’params1’, .0, ’sharp’
• loose – ’8x128x2’, ’params2’, .2, ’10
• over x2 – ’8x128x2’, ’params1’, 2.0, ’10
• over x10 – ’8x128x2’, ’params1’, 10.0, ’10
• sharp2 – ’8x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ‘sharp’
• sharp3 - ’32x64x1’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sharp4 - 32x2x1’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sharp5 - ’32x64x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter1 1 - ’4x32x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter1 2 - ’8x32x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter1 3 - ’16x32x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter1 4 - ’32x32x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter1 5 - ’64x32x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter1 6 - ’128x32x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter1 7 - ’256x32x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
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• sim bloom filter2 1 - ’4x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter2 2 - ’8x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter2 3 - ’16x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter2 4 - ’32x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter2 5 - ’64x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter2 6 - ’128x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter2 7 - ’256x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter3 1 - ’4x32x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter3 2 - ’8x32x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter3 3 - ’16x32x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter3 4 - ’32x32x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter3 5 - ’64x32x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter3 6 - ’128x32x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter3 7 - ’256x32x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter4 1 - ’4x128x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter4 2 - ’8x128x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter4 3 - ’16x128x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter4 4 - ’32x128x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter4 5 - ’64x128x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter4 6 - ’128x128x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim bloom filter4 7 - ’256x128x4’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim hash1 1 - ’8x128x1’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim hash1 2 - ’8x128x2’, ’params4’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim hash1 3 - ’8x128x4’, ’params5’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim hash1 4 - ’8x128x8’, ’params6’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim hash1 5 - ’8x128x16’, ’params7’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim cohort1 1 - ’8x2x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim cohort1 2 - ’8x4x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim cohort1 3 - ’8x8x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim cohort1 4 - ’8x16x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim cohort1 5 - ’8x32x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim cohort1 6 - ’8x64x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
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• sim cohort1 7 - ’8x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim cohort1 8 - ’8x256x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim probs1 1 - ’8x128x2’, ’params3’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim probs1 2 - ’8x128x2’, ’params8’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim probs1 3 - ’8x128x2’, ’params9’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim probs1 4 - ’8x128x2’, ’params10’, .0, ’sharp’
• sim probs1 5 - ’8x128x2’, ’params11’, .0, ’sharp’
10.1 Candidates
• sharp - The data is not altered
• 10% - Miss every 10th string
10.2 Bloom filter params (k, h,m)
• 8x16x2 - (8, 2, 16)
• 8x32x2 - (8, 2, 32)
• 8x128x2 - (8, 2, 128)
• 128x8x2 - (128, 2, 8)
• 32x64x1 - (32, 1, 64)
• 32x2x1 - (32, 1, 2)
• 32x64x2 - (32, 2, 64)
• 4x32x2 - (4, 2, 32)
• 8x32x2 - (8, 2, 32)
• 16x32x2 - (16, 2, 32)
• 32x32x2 - (32, 2, 32)
• 64x32x2 - (64, 2, 32)
• 128x32x2 - (128, 2, 32)
• 256x32x2 - (256, 2, 32)
• 4x128x2 - (4, 2, 128)
• 16x128x2 - (16, 2, 128)
• 32x128x2 - (32, 2, 128)
• 64x128x2 - (64, 2, 128)
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• 128x128x2 - (128, 2, 128)
• 256x128x2 - (256, 2, 128)
• 8x2x2 - (8, 2, 2)
• 8x4x2 - (8, 2, 4)
• 8x8x2 - (8, 2, 8)
• 8x16x2 - (8, 2, 16)
• 8x32x2 - (8, 2, 32)
• 8x64x2 - (8, 2, 64)
• 8x256x2 - (8, 2, 256)
• 4x32x4 - (4, 4, 32)
• 8x32x4 - (8, 4, 32)
• 16x32x4 - (16, 4, 32)
• 32x32x4 - (32, 4, 32)
• 64x32x4 - (64, 4, 32)
• 128x32x4 - (128, 4, 32)
• 256x32x4 - (256, 4, 32)
• 4x128x4 - (4, 4, 128)
• 8x128x4 - (8, 4, 128)
• 16x128x4 - (16, 4, 128)
• 32x128x4 - (32, 4, 128)
• 64x128x4 - (64, 4, 128)
• 128x128x4 - (128, 4, 128)
• 256x128x4 - (256, 4, 128)
• 8x128x1 - (8, 1, 128)
• 8x128x4 - (8, 4, 128)
• 8x128x8 - (8, 8, 128)
• 8x128x16 - (8, 16, 128)
10.3 Privacy params (p, q, f)
• params1 - (0.39, 0.61, 0.45)
• params2 - (0.225, 0.775, 0.0)
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• params3 - (0.5, 0.75, 0.0)
• params4 - (0.3, 0.7941, 0.0)
• params5 - (0.313, 0.441, 0.0)
• params6 - (0.313, 0.37486, 0.0)
• params7 - (0.313, 0.3436, 0.0)
• params8 - (0.467, 0.75, 0.1)
• params9 - (0.3999, 0.889, 0.5)
• params10 - (0.695, 0.9043, 0.2)
• params11 - (0.186, 0.407, 0.0)
• params12 - (0.5, 0.75, 0.75)
• params13 - (0.25, 0.75, 0.5)
Appendix D: Executing the add-on
Install
1. To compile the add-on: npm install && npm run build
2. At second shell/prompt, watch files for changes to rebuild: npm run watch
3. In Firefox:
(a) about:debugging > [load temporary addon] > choose dist/addon.xpi
(b) tools > Web Developer > Browser Toolbox.
Simulations
To validate using the simulator, the addon can be set to work in simulation
mode:
1. Clone the RAPPOR simulator repository:
git clone https://github.com/mozilla/rappor
2. Follow the instructions to install the dependencies.
3. Generate data (You can find the list of possible data distributions in
tests/regtest spec.py): ./regtest.sh gen-values ’zipf1.5-tiny2-sim final2’
4. Set the option isSimulation to true in addon/Config.jsm.
5. Set the option rapporSimulatorPath to the location of the RAPPOR
simulator in addon/Config.jsm.
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6. Build the addon with npm run build.
7. Run the addon. In Firefox: about:debugging > [load temporary addon]
> choose dist/addon.xpi.
8. Perform the analysis: ./regtest.sh analysis ’r-zipf1.5-tiny2-sim final2’
1 ’python’
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